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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subad-
ditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fairness and efficiency of allocations is measured by
the generalized means of the values that the allocations generate among the agents. Parameterized by
an exponent term p, generalized-mean welfares encompass multiple well-studied objectives, such as
social welfare, Nash social welfare, and egalitarian welfare.
We establish that, under identical subadditive valuations and in the demand oracle model, one can
efficiently find a single allocation that approximates the optimal generalized-mean welfare—to within
a factor of 40—uniformly for all p ∈ (−∞, 1]. Hence, by way of a constant-factor approximation
algorithm, we obtain novel results for maximizing Nash social welfare and egalitarian welfare for
identical subadditive valuations.
1 Introduction
A significant body of recent work, in algorithmic game theory, has been directed towards the study
of fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among agents; see, e.g., [End17] and [BCE+16].
This thread of research has led to the development of multiple algorithms and platforms (e.g., Splid-
dit [GP15]) which, in particular, address settings wherein discrete resources (that cannot be fractionally
allocated) need to be partitioned among multiple agents. Contributing to this line of work, the current
paper studies discrete fair division from a welfarist perspective.
We specifically address the problem of finding allocations (of indivisible goods) that (approximately)
maximize the generalized means of the agents’ valuations. Formally, for exponent parameter p ∈ R,
the pth generalized mean, of n nonnegative values {vi}ni=1, is defined as Mp(v1, . . . , vn) :=
(
1
n
∑
i v
p
i
) 1
p .
Parameterized by p, this family of functions includes well-studied fairness and efficiency objectives,
such as average social welfare (p = 1), Nash social welfare (p → 0), and egalitarian welfare (p → −∞).
In fact, generalized means—with the exponent parameter p in the range (−∞, 1]—admit a fundamental
axiomatic characterization: up to monotonic transformations, generalized means (with p ∈ (−∞, 1])
exactly constitute the family of welfare functions that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and a
few other key axioms [Mou04].1 Hence, by way of developing a single approximation algorithm for
maximizing generalized means, the current work provides a unified treatment of multiple fairness and
efficiency measures.
With generalized mean as our objective, we focus on fair-division instances in which the agents
have a common subadditive (i.e., complement free) valuation. Formally, a set function v, defined over
a set of indivisible goods [m], is a said to be subadditive iff, for all subsets A and B of [m], we have
v(A ∪ B) ≤ v(A) + v(B). This class of functions includes many other well-studied valuation families,
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1Note that generalized means are ordinally equivalent to CES (constant elasticity of substitution) functions.
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namely XOS, submodular, and additive valuations.2 These function classes have been used extensively in
computer science and mathematical economics to represent agents’ valuations. Of particular relevance
here are results that (in the context of combinatorial auctions) address the problem of maximizing social
welfare under submodular, XOS, and, more generally, subadditive valuations [NRTV07].
The focus on a common valuation function across the agents provides a technically interesting and
applicable subclass of fair-division problems–as a stylized application, consider a setting in which the
agents’ values represent money, i.e., for every agent, the value of each subset (of the goods) is equal to
the subset’s monetary worth. Here, one encounters subadditivity when considering goods that are sub-
stitutes of each other. Also, from a technical standpoint, we note that the problem of maximizing social
welfare is APX-hard even under identical submodular [KLMM08] and subadditive valuations [DNS05].
Appendix B extends this hardness result to all p ∈ (−∞, 1].
Our Results: Addressing fair-division instances with identical subadditive valuations, we develop
an efficient constant-factor approximation algorithm for the generalized-mean objective (Theorem 1).
Specifically, our algorithm computes an allocation (of the indivisible goods among the agents), A, with
the property that its generalized-mean welfare, Mp(A), is at least 1/40 times the optimal p-mean wel-
fare, for all p ∈ (−∞, 1]. This result in fact implies an interesting existential guarantee as well: if in
a fair-division instance the agents’ valuations are identical and subadditive, then there exists a single
allocation that uniformly approximates the optimal p-mean welfare for all p ∈ (−∞, 1].
The tradeoff between fairness and economic efficiency is an important consideration in fair division
literature.3 The relevance of the above-mentioned existential guarantee is substantiated by the fact that
this result reasonably mitigates the fairness-efficiency tradeoff in the current context; it shows that for
identical subadditive valuations there exists a single allocation which is near optimal with respect to
efficiency objectives (in particular, social welfare) as well as fairness measures (e.g., egalitarian welfare).
Note that such an allocation cannot be simply obtained by selecting an arbitrary partition that (approxi-
mately) maximizes social welfare: under identical additive valuations, all the allocations have the same
social welfare, even the ones with egalitarian welfare equal to zero. One can also construct instances,
with identical subadditive valuations, wherein particular allocations have optimal egalitarian welfare,
but subpar social welfare.
Even specific instantiations of our algorithmic guarantee provide novel results: while the problem
of maximizing Nash social welfare, among n agents, admits an O(n log n)-approximation under non-
identical submodular valuations [GKK20], the current work provides a novel (constant-factor) approx-
imation guarantee for maximizing Nash social welfare when the agents share a common subadditive
(and, hence, submodular) valuation.4 Analogously, the instantiation of our result for egalitarian welfare
is interesting in and of itself.
Given that the valuations considered in this work express combinatorial preferences, a naive rep-
resentation of such set functions would require exponential (in the number of goods) values, one for
each subset of the goods. Hence, to primarily focus on the underlying computational aspects and not
on the representation details, much of prior work assumes that the valuations are provided via oracles
that can only answer particular type of queries. The most basic oracle considered in literature answers
value queries: given a subset of the indivisible goods, the value oracle returns the value of this subset. In
this value oracle model, the work of Vondra´k [Von08] considers submodular valuations and provides
an efficient ee−1 -approximation algorithm for maximizing social welfare. Using this method as a sub-
routine and, hence, completely in the value oracle model, our algorithm achieves the above-mentioned
2Recall that a submodular function f is defined by a diminishing returns property: f(A + e) − f(A) ≥ f(B +
e)− f(B), for all subsets A ⊆ B and e /∈ B.
3For example, consider the work on price of fairness [BFT11; BLMS19]
4Under nonidentical additive valuations, there exists a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation algorithm for
maximizing Nash social welfare [BKV18a]. Furthermore, under identical additive valuations, maximizing Nash
social welfare admits a polynomial-time approximation scheme [NR14; BKV18b].
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approximation guarantee for identical submodular valuations.
Another well-studied oracle addresses demand queries. Specifically, such an oracle, when queried
with an assignment of prices p1, . . . , pm ∈ R to the m goods, returns maxS⊆[m]
(
v(S)−∑j∈S pj), for the
underlying valuation function v.5 Demand oracles have been often utilized in prior work for addressing
social welfare maximization in the context of subadditive and XOS valuations [NRTV07]. In particular,
the work of Fiege [Fei09] shows that, under subadditive valuations and assuming oracle access to de-
mand queries,6 the social welfare maximization problem admits an efficient 2-approximation algorithm.
Demand queries are unavoidable in the subadditive case: one can directly extend the result of Dobzinski
et al. [DNS10] to show that, even under identical (subadditive) valuations, any sub-linear (in n) approx-
imation of the optimal social welfare requires exponentially many value queries. At the same time, we
note that our algorithm requires demand oracle access only to implement the 2-approximation algorithm
of Fiege [Fei09] as a subroutine. Beyond this, we can work with the value oracle.
RelatedWork: Multiple algorithmic and hardness results have been developed to address welfare maxi-
mization in the context of indivisible goods/discrete resources. Though, in contrast to the present paper,
prior work in this direction has primarily addressed one welfare function at a time.
As mentioned previously, maximizing social welfare and Nash social welfare (see, e.g., [CG18] and
references therein) has been actively studied in algorithmic game theory. Egalitarian welfare has also
been addressed in prior work–this welfare maximization problem is also referred to as the max-min allo-
cation problem (or the Santa Claus problem); see, e.g., [AKS14]. Specifically, for maximizing egalitarian
welfare under additive and nonidentical valuations, the result of Chakrabarty et al. [CCK09] provides
an O˜(nε)-approximation algorithm that runs in time O(n 1ε ); here n denotes the number of agents and
ε > 0. Furthermore, under nonidentical submodular valuations, the problem of maximizing egalitarian
welfare is known to admit a polynomial-time O˜(n1/4m1/2)-approximation algorithm [GHIM09]; here
m is the number of goods. In contrast to these sublinear approximations, this paper shows that, if the
agents’ valuations are identical, then even under subadditive valuations the problem of maximizing
egalitarian welfare admits a constant-factor approximation guarantee.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
An instance of a fair-division problem corresponds to a tuple 〈[m], [n], v〉, where [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
denotes the set of m ∈ N indivisible goods that have to be allocated (partitioned) among the set of n ∈ N
agents, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Here, v : 2[m] 7→ R+ represents the (identical) valuation function of the
agents;7 specifically, v(S) ∈ R+ is the value that each agent i ∈ [n] has for a subset of goods S ⊆ [m].
We will assume throughout that the valuation function v is (i) normalized: v(∅) = 0, (ii) monotone:
v(A) ≤ v(B) for allA ⊆ B ⊆ [m], and (iii) subadditive: v(A∪B) ≤ v(A)+v(B) for all subsetsA,B ⊆ [m].
Write Πn([m]) to denote the collection of all n partitions of the indivisible goods [m]. We use the
term allocation to refer to an n-partitionA = (A1, . . . An) ∈ Πn([m]) of the m goods. Here, Ai denotes the
subset of goods allocated to agent i ∈ [n] and will be referred to as a bundle.
Generalized (Ho¨lder) means, Mp, constitute a family of functions that capture multiple fairness and
efficiency measures. Formally, for an exponent parameter p ∈ R, the pth generalized mean of n nonneg-
ative numbers x1, . . . , xn ∈ R+ is defined as Mp(x1, . . . , xn) :=
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xpi
) 1
p
.
5Observe that a value query can be simulated via polynomially many demand queries. Though, the converse
is not true [NRTV07].
6This result holds even if the agents have distinct, but subadditive, valuations.
7Recall that this work addresses fair-division instances in which all the agents have a common valuation func-
tion.
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Note that, when p = 1, Mp reduces to the arithmetic mean. Also, as p tends to zero, Mp, in the limit,
is equal to the geometric mean and limp→−∞Mp(x1, . . . , xn) = min{x1, x2, . . . , xn}. Hence, following
standard convention, we will write M0(x1, . . . , xn) = (
∏n
i=1 xi)
1/n and M−∞(x1, . . . , xn) = mini xi.
Considering generalized means as a parameterized collection of welfare objectives, we define the
p-mean welfare, Mp(A), of an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) as
Mp(A) := Mp (v(A1), . . . , v(An)) =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(Ai)
p
)1/p
(1)
Here, v is the (common) valuation function of the agents. Indeed, with p equal to one, zero, and −∞,
the p-mean welfare, respectively, corresponds to (average) social welfare, Nash social welfare, and egal-
itarian welfare.
Given a fair-division instance I = 〈[m], [n], v〉 and p ∈ (−∞, 1], ideally, we would like to find an
allocationA = (A1, . . . , An) with as large an Mp(A) value as possible, i.e., maximize the p-mean welfare.
An allocation that achieves this goal will be referred to as a p-optimal allocation and denoted byA∗(I, p) =
(A∗1(I, p), A∗2(I, p), . . . , A∗n(I, p)).
We note that, under identical, subadditive valuations, finding a p-optimal allocation is APX-hard,
for any p ∈ (−∞, 1] (Appendix B). Hence, the current work considers approximation guarantees. In
particular, for fair-division instances I in which the agents have a common subadditive valuation,
we develop a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a single allocation A with the property that
Mp(A) ≥ 140Mp(A∗(I, p)) for all p ∈ (−∞, 1]. That is, the developed algorithm achieves an approxima-
tion ratio of 40 uniformly for all p ∈ (−∞, 1].
The work of Fiege [Fei09] shows that, for subadditive valuations, the social-welfare maximization
problem (equivalently, the problem of maximizing M1(·)) admits an efficient 2-approximation algorithm,
assuming oracle access to demand queries. In particular, such an oracle, when queried with an as-
signment of prices p1, . . . , pm ∈ R to the m goods, returns maxS⊆[m]
(
v(S)−∑j∈S pj). Our algorithm
requires demand oracle access only to implement the 2-approximation algorithm of Fiege [Fei09] as a
subroutine. Beyond this, we can work with the basic value oracle, which when queried with a subset of
goods S ⊆ [m], returns v(S).
In fact, if the underlying valuation is submodular, then one can invoke the result of Vondra´k [Von08]
(instead of using the approximation algorithm by Feige [Fei09]) and efficiently obtain a ee−1 -approximation
for the social-welfare maximization problem in the value oracle model. Hence, under a submodular val-
uation, our algorithm can be implemented entirely in the standard value oracle model.
For a fair-division instance I, write F(I) to denote the 1-mean welfare M1 (i.e., the average social
welfare) of the allocation computed by the approximation algorithm of Feige [Fei09]. The approximation
guarantee established in [Fei09] ensures that—for any instance I with a subadditive valuation—we have
F(I) ≥ 12M1(A∗(I, 1)). Here, A∗(I, 1) denotes a 1-optimal allocation, i.e., it maximizes the (average)
social welfare in I.
3 Maximizing p-Mean Welfare
Addressing fair-division instances with identical subadditive valuations, this section presents an effi-
cient algorithm for computing a constant-factor approximation to the p-mean welfare objective, uni-
formly for all p ∈ (−∞, 1].
The algorithm consists of two phases, Algorithm 1 (ALG) and Algorithm 2 (ALGLOW). In the first
phase, “high-value” goods are assigned as singletons–we use the approximation algorithm of Feige [Fei09]
to obtain an estimate of the optimal 1-mean welfare and deem a good to be of high value if its val-
uation is at least a constant (specifically, 1/3.53) times this estimate. Intuitively, the estimate provides
a useful benchmark, since the optimal 1-mean welfare upper bounds the optimal p-mean welfare for
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all p ∈ (−∞, 1] (Proposition 1); this bound essentially follows from the generalized mean inequal-
ity [BMV88] which asserts that, for all p ∈ (−∞, 1], the p-mean welfare of any allocation A is at most its
1-mean welfare, Mp(A) ≤ M1(A).
Therefore, in phase one of the algorithm, we sort the goods in non-increasing order by value and
iteratively select goods, which by themselves provide a value comparable to that of the optimal p-mean
welfare. In each iteration, the selected good is assigned as a singleton to an agent and this agent-good
pair is removed from consideration. Note that such an update leads to a new fair-division instance
with one less good and one less agent, as well as a potentially different optimal 1-mean welfare. The
key technical issue here is that the change in the optimal 1-mean welfare (and, hence, its estimate ob-
tained via Feige’s algorithm) can be non-monotonic. Nonetheless, via an inductive argument, we show
that the welfare contribution of the goods assigned (as singletons) in the first phase is sufficiently large
(Lemma 3).
The first phase terminates when we obtain an instance J wherein each good is of value no more
than a constant times its optimal 1-mean welfare. The second phase (ALGLOW) is designed to address
such a fair-division instance. In particular, we show that, in the absence of high-value goods, we can
efficiently find an allocation B = (Bi)i such that each bundle Bi is of value at least constant times the
optimal p-mean welfare of J . To obtain the allocation B, we first compute (via Feige’s approximation
algorithm) an allocation S = (Sj)j that provides a 2-approximation to the optimal 1-mean welfare of J .
Subsequently, we show that the subsets Sjs, that have appropriately high value, can be partitioned to
form the desired bundles Bis, which constitute the allocation B.
Multiple technical lemmas (in Sections 5 and 6) are required to show that the two phases in combi-
nation lead to the desired p-welfare bound. It is also relevant to note that, while the above-mentioned
ideas hold at a high level, the formal guarantees are obtained by separately analyzing different ranges
of the exponent parameter p.
Algorithm 1 ALG
Input: A fair-division instance I = 〈[m], [n], v〉 with demand oracle access to the subadditive valuation
function v.
Output: An allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An)
1: Initialize the set of agents U = [n], the set of goods G = [m], and bundle Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ U
2: Index all the goods in non-increasing order of value v(g1) ≥ v(g2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(gm)
3: Set I0 = 〈G,U, v〉 and initialize t = 1 {Recall that F(I) = M1(S), where S denotes the allocation
obtained by executing Feige’s algorithm [Fei09] on instance I.}
4: while v(gt) ≥ 13.53 F(It−1) do
5: Allocate At ← {gt} and update G← G \ {gt} along with U ← U \ {t}
6: Set It = 〈G,U, v〉 and update t← t+ 1
7: end while
8: Set (At, At+1, . . . , An) = ALGLOW(G,U, v) {This step corresponds to the second phase of the algo-
rithm which assigns bundles to the remaining |U | = n− t+ 1 agents. Also, note that, in the current
instance J := 〈G,U, v〉, for every good g ∈ G we have v(g) < 13.53F(J ).}
9: return allocation A = (A1, A2, ..., An).
The following theorem constitutes the main result of the current work. It asserts that Algorithm 1
(ALG) achieves a constant-factor approximation ratio for the p-mean welfare maximization problem.
Theorem 1 (Main Result). Let I = 〈[m], [n], v〉 be a fair-division instance wherein all the agents have an
identical, subadditive valuation function v. Given demand oracle access to v, ALG computes in polynomial time an
allocation A that, for all p ∈ (−∞, 1], provides a 40-approximation to the optimal p-mean welfare, i.e., Mp(A) ≥
1
40 Mp(A∗(I, p)), for all p ∈ (−∞, 1]; here, A∗(I, p) is the p-optimal allocation in I.
We first consider an instance J wherein all the goods are of value a constant times less than F(J )
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Algorithm 2 ALGLOW
Input: A fair-division instance J = 〈G,U, v〉 with demand oracle access to the subadditive valuation
function v.
Output: An allocation B = (B1, B2, . . . , B|U |)
1: Execute Feige’s approximation algorithm [Fei09] on the given instance J to compute allocation S =
(S1, S2, . . . , S|U |). {Note that allocation S provides a 2-approximation to the optimal 1-mean welfare of J ,
M1(S) = F(J ) ≥ 12M1 (A∗(J , 1))}
2: Index the bundles such that v(S1) ≥ . . . ≥ v(S|U |) and initialize i = a = 1 along with B` = ∅ for 1 ≤ ` ≤ |U |
{Lemma 1 shows that the following loop runs to completion}
3: while agent index a < |U | do
4: Consider an arbitrary good g ∈ Si
5: if v(Ba ∪ {g}) < 13F(J ) then
6: Update Ba ← Ba ∪ {g} and Si ← Si \ {g} {Here good g is assigned to bundle Ba to increase its value}
7: else
8: Update a← a+ 1 {This update is performed when sufficient value has been accumulated in a bundle}
9: end if
10: if v(Si) < 13F(J ) then
11: Update i← i+ 1 {Once the value of Si drops below 13F(J ) we consider the next bundle in S}
12: end if
13: end while
14: B|U | ← B|U | ∪
(
G \ (
|U |−1⋃
a=1
Ba)
)
{Assign the remaining elements to B|U |}
15: return partition B = (B1, . . . , B|U |).
and prove that, for such an instance, ALGLOW finds an allocation in which the value of every bundle
is comparable to the optimal average social welfare of J . In Section 7, we use this fact and supporting
lemmas from Sections 5 and 6 to prove Theorem 1 for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4). Finally, in Section 8, we prove the
main result for p ∈ [0.4, 1].
We start with the following observation to upper bound the optimal p-mean welfare in terms of the
optimal 1-mean welfare.
Proposition 1. Let I be a fair-division instance in which all the agents have an identical, subadditive valuation
v. Then, for each p ∈ (−∞, 1], the optimal 1-mean welfare is at least as large as the optimal p-mean welfare:
M1(A∗(I, 1)) ≥ Mp(A∗(I, p)) for every p ∈ (−∞, 1]
Proof The generalized mean inequality (see, e.g., [BMV88]) applied to the allocation A∗(I, p), gives us
Mp(A∗(I, p)) ≤ M1(A∗(I, p)), for all p ∈ (−∞, 1]. By definition, the allocation A∗(I, 1) maximizes the
1-mean welfare, M1(·), and, hence, the claim follows M1(A∗(I, 1)) ≥ M1(A∗(I, p)) ≥ Mp(A∗(I, p)). uunionsq
4 Approximation Guarantee for ALGLOW
This section addresses the second phase of the algorithm (ALGLOW) that—by the processing performed
in the while-loop of ALG—solely needs to consider fair-division instances J = 〈G,U, v〉 wherein all the
goods g ∈ G satisfy v(g) ≤ 13.53F(J ), i.e., the goods are of “low value.” The following lemma establishes
that, for such instances, ALGLOW finds bundles each with value comparable to the optimal 1-mean
welfare (and, hence, comparable to the optimal p-mean welfare) of J .
Recall that here G is a subset of the original set of goods [m], U is a subset of the [n] agents, and F(J )
denotes the 1-mean welfare (average social welfare) of the allocation computed by Feige’s approxima-
tion algorithm for instance J .
6
Lemma 1. Let J = 〈G,U, v〉 be a fair-division instance in which all the agents have an identical subadditive
valuation function v, and every good g ∈ G satisfies v(g) ≤ 13.53F(J ). Then, in the demand oracle model,
the algorithm ALGLOW efficiently computes an allocation B = (B1, . . . , B|U |) with the property that, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , |U |},
v(Bi) ≥ 1
40
M1(A∗(J , 1)) ≥ 1
40
Mp(A∗(J , p)).
Proof For input instance J , Feige’s algorithm returns an allocation S = (S1, S2, . . . , S|U |) with near-
optimal average social welfare:
1
|U |
|U |∑
i=1
v(Si) = F(J ) ≥ 1
2
M1(A∗(J , 1))
Given allocation S = (S1, S2, . . . , S|U |), we show that one can partition Sis to form |U | bundles such
that the value of each bundle is at least 140M1(A∗(J , 1)). Note that, by the assumption in the lemma, for
each g ∈ G we have
v(g) ≤ 1
3.53
F(J ) (2)
Let H :=
{
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |U |} | v(Si) ≥ 13F(J )
}
denote the subsets in S with value at least 13F(J ).
These are the subsets we split to form bundles B′is that form the output allocation B.
Since v is subadditive, we have the following lower bound on the cumulative value of the subsets in
H
∑
i∈H
v(Si) ≥
|U |∑
j=1
v(Sj)− 1
3
F(J ) · |U | = 2
3
|U | · F(J ) (3)
Claim 1. Let S = (S1, . . . , S|U |) be the allocation computed by Feige’s algorithm for input instance J . Then,
every Si, with the property that v(Si) ≥ 13F(J ), can be partitioned into at least k =
(
3v(Si)
F(J ) − 1
)
subsets
T 1i , . . . , T
k
i such that v(T
j
i ) ≥ 120F(J ) for each T ji .
Proof Initialize T 1i to be the empty set. Then, we keep transferring goods—in any order and one at a
time—from Si to T 1i till the value of T
1
i goes over
1
3F(J ). Returning the last such good back into Si, the
populated set T 1i satisfies
v(T 1i ) ≥
1
3
F(J )− 1
3.53
F(J ) (using (2) and the subadditivity of v)
≥ 1
20
F(J )
Note that, by construction, v(T 1i ) ≤ 13F(J ). Therefore, using the subadditivity of v, we get v(Si \ T 1i ) ≥
v(Si)− 13F(J ).
We can repeat the above process to obtain subsets T 1i , . . . T
k
i and stop when v
(
Si \ (T 1i ∪ . . . ∪ T ki )
) ≤
1
3F(J ).Given that, for each T ji , we remove a subset of value atmost 13F(I) from Si, the subadditivity of v
gives us v
(
Si \ (T 1i ∪ . . . ∪ T ki )
) ≥ v(Si)− kF(J )3 . Hence, the following lower bound holds k ≥ 3v(Si)F(J ) − 1.
In other words, we can extract at least 3v(Si)F(J ) − 1 bundles, each of value no less than 120F(J ), from Si. uunionsq
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We now apply the same procedure to every subset in H :=
{
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |U |} | v(Si) ≥ 13F(J )
}
to
obtain k
′
=
|H|∑
i=1
(
3v(Si)
F(J ) − 1
)
bundles, each of value at least 120F(J ). Using this equation and inequality
(3), we get
k
′ ≥ 2|U |F(J )
F(J ) − |H| ≥ 2|U | − |U | (Since |H| < |U |)
= |U |
In conclusion, one can construct at least |U | bundles of value at least 120F(J ) ≥ 140M1(A∗(J , 1)).
Note that this observation implies that ALGLOW successfully finds |U | bundles each of value at least
1
40M1(A∗(J , 1)).
Proposition 1 gives us M1(A∗(J , 1)) ≥ Mp(A∗(J , p)) and, hence, the stated claim follows. uunionsq
With an approximation guarantee for ALGLOW in hand, we next analyze the first phase of the
algorithm–specifically, analyze the while-loop in ALG. Note that in each iteration of this while-loop
(Steps (4) to (7)) a good of value at least constant times the optimal 1-mean welfare (of the current
instance) is allocated as a singleton to an agent. We will show that these singleton assignments comple-
ment the subsequent use of ALGLOW, in the sense that the two phases together retain welfare guaran-
tees. To formally prove Theorem 1, we first state and prove two useful results, Lemma 2 (in Section 5)
and Lemma 3 (in Section 6).
5 Structural Lemma
The following lemma provides a structural property of p-optimal allocationsA∗(I, p), for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
It states that the only way allocation A∗(I, p) has a bundle A∗i (I, p) of notably high value is through a
single good g ∈ A∗i (I, p) that by itself has high value.
Lemma 2. Let L = 〈[M ], [N ], v〉 be a fair-division instance wherein all the N ∈ N agents have an identical,
subadditive valuation v over the set of M ∈ N goods. In addition, let A∗(L, p) = {A∗1(L, p), · · · , A∗N (L, p)} be a
p-mean optimal allocation in L, for any p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
If for any bundle A∗i (L, p), with i ∈ [N ], we have v(A∗i (L, p)) > 11.33 F(L), then there exists a good
g ∈ A∗i (L, p) with the property that that v(g) ≥ 140v(A∗i (L, p)).
The proof of the above lemma is divided into three parts (Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) depending on the
range of the exponent parameter p.
5.1 Proof of Lemma 2 for p ∈ (−∞, 0)
Assume, towards a contradiction, that v(A∗i (L, p)) > 11.33 F(L), for some i ∈ [N ], and v(g) ≤ 140v(A∗i (L, p))
for all g ∈ A∗i (L, p). Recall that the 1-mean welfare of the allocation returned by Feige’s algorithm sat-
isfies F(L) ≥ 12M1(A∗(L, 1)). Pick a bundle A∗j (L, p) (in A∗(L, p)) with the property that v(A∗j (L, p)) ≤
2F(L). Such a bundle exists, since 2F(L) ≥ M1(A∗(L, 1)) ≥ M1(A∗(L, p)).
Define a partition—A′i and A
′
j—of A
∗
i as follows:
(i) Initialize A′j to be the empty set. Then, we keep transferring goods from A
∗
i (L, p) to A′j (one at a time
and in an arbitrary order) and stop as soon as the value of A′j exceeds
v(A∗i (L,p))
2 .
(ii) Denote the remaining set of goods asA′i := A
∗
i (L, p)\A′j . Note that, by construction, v(A′j) ≥ v(A
∗
i (L,p))
2
and v(A′i) ≥
(
1
2 − 140
)
v(A∗i (L, p)). The last inequality follows from the fact that v is subadditive and the
assumption that goods in A∗i (L, p) are of value at most 140v(A∗i (L, p)).
(iii) Write B = {B1, . . . , BN} to denote the allocation obtained by replacing the bundles A∗i (L, p) and
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A∗j (L, p) in A∗(L, p) by A′i and A∗j (L, p) ∪ A′j , respectively: Bi = A′i and Bj = A∗j (L, p) ∪ A′j along with
B` = A
∗
` (L, p) for all ` ∈ [N ] \ {i, j}.
We will show that B has p-mean welfare strictly greater than that of the p-optimal allocationA∗(L, p).
Hence, by way of contradiction, the desired result follows.
Recall that the current case addresses exponent parameters that are negative, p ∈ (−∞, 0). Hence,
the following inequality implies that the p-mean welfare of B is strictly greater than that of A∗(L, p):
v(A′i)
p + v(A′j)
p < v(A∗i (L, p))p + v(A∗j (L, p))p (4)
However, for negative p, the lower bounds on the values of A′i and A
′
j gives us
v(A′i)
p + v(A′j)
p ≤
(
1
2
− 1
40
)p
v(A∗i (L, p))p +
(
1
2
)p
v(A∗i (L, p))p.
In addition, using the bounds v(A∗j (L, p)) ≤ 2F(L) < 211.33v(A∗i (L, p)), we get
v(A∗i (L, p))p + v(A∗j (L, p))p > v(A∗i (L, p))p +
(
2
11.33
)p
v(A∗i (L, p))p.
Therefore, the desired equation (4) follows from the following numeric inequality, which is estab-
lished in Appendix A.(
1
2
− 1
40
)p
+
(
1
2
)p
≤ 1 +
(
2
11.33
)p
for all p ∈ (−∞, 0).
This establishes Lemma 2 for p ∈ (−∞, 0).
5.2 Proof of Lemma 2 for p ∈ (0, 0.4)
Assume, towards a contradiction, that v(A∗i (L, p)) > 11.33 F(L), for some i ∈ [N ], and v(g) ≤ 140v(A∗i (L, p))
for all g ∈ A∗i (L, p). Recall that the 1-mean welfare of the allocation returned by Feige’s algorithm sat-
isfies F(L) ≥ 12M1(A∗(L, 1)). Pick a bundle A∗j (L, p) (in A∗(L, p)) with the property that v(A∗j (L, p)) ≤
2F(L). Such a bundle exists, since 2F(L) ≥ M1(A∗(L, 1)) ≥ M1(A∗(L, p)).
Define a partition—A′i and A
′
j—of A
∗
i (L, p) as follows:
(i) Initialize A′j to be the empty set. Then, we keep transferring goods from A
∗
i (L, p) to A′j (one at a time
and in an arbitrary order) and stop as soon as the value of A′j exceeds
v(A∗i (L,p))
2 .
(ii) Denote the remaining set of goods asA′i := A
∗
i (L, p)\A′j . Note that, by construction, v(A′j) ≥ v(A
∗
i (L,p))
2
and v(A′i) ≥
(
1
2 − 140
)
v(A∗i (L, p)). The last inequality follows from the fact that v is subadditive and the
assumption that goods in A∗i (L, p) are of value at most 140v(A∗i (L, p)).
(iii) Write B = {B1, . . . , BN} to denote the allocation obtained by replacing the bundles A∗i (L, p) and
A∗j (L, p) in A∗(L, p) by A′i and A∗j (L, p) ∪ A′j , respectively: Bi = A′i and Bj = A∗j (L, p) ∪ A′j along with
B` = A
∗
` (L, p) for all ` ∈ [N ] \ {i, j}.
We will show that B has p-mean welfare strictly greater than that of the p-optimal allocationA∗(L, p).
Hence, by way of contradiction, the desired result follows.
Notice that the construction of A′i, A
′
j and B hold for p = 0 as well. We will use these sets in the next
section to prove an analogous result for Nash social welfare.
The current case addresses exponent parameters that are positive p ∈ (0, 0.4). Hence, the following
inequality implies that the p-mean welfare of B is strictly greater than that of A∗(L, p)
v(A′i)
p + v(A′j)
p > v(A∗i (L, p))p + v(A∗j (L, p))p (5)
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However, for positive p, the lower bounds on the values of A′i and A
′
j gives us
v(A′i)
p + v(A′j)
p ≥
(
1
2
− 1
40
)p
v(A∗i (L, p))p +
(
1
2
)p
v(A∗i (L, p))p.
In addition, using the bounds v(A∗j (L, p)) ≤ 2F(L) < 211.33v(A∗i (L, p)), we get
v(A∗i (L, p))p + v(A∗j (L, p))p < v(A∗i (L, p))p +
(
2
11.33
)p
v(A∗i (L, p))p.
Therefore, the desired equation (5) follows from the following numeric inequality, which is estab-
lished in Appendix A. (
1
2
− 1
40
)p
+
(
1
2
)p
≥ 1 +
(
2
11.33
)p
for p ∈ (0, 0.4).
This establishes Lemma 2 for p ∈ (0, 0.4).
5.3 Proof of Lemma 2 for Nash Social Welfare (p = 0)
Recall the sets A′i, A
′
j , and the allocation B defined in Section 5.2. We will show that B has Nash welfare
strictly greater than that of A∗(L, 0), and hence, by way of contradiction, establish the desired result.
In order to obtain M0(B) > M0(A∗(L, 0)), it suffices to prove that v(A′i)v(A′j) > v (A∗i (L, 0)) v(A∗j (L, 0)).
The lower bounds we obtained on the values of A′i and A
′
j gives us
v(A′i)v(A
′
j) ≥
(
1
2
− 1
40
)
v (A∗i (L, 0))
v (A∗i (L, 0))
2
≥ 0.2 v (A∗i (L, 0))2
In addition, we have
v (A∗i (L, 0)) v
(
A∗j (L, 0)
)
<
2
11.33
v (A∗i (L, 0))2 < 0.18 v (A∗i (L, 0))2
Therefore, the lemma holds for p = 0 as well.
6 Combination Lemma
The following lemma shows that the goods assigned as singletons in the while-loop of ALG (Algo-
rithm 1), along with a p-optimal allocation of instance J that remains at the termination of the loop,
lead to a p-mean welfare that is comparable to the optimal, for all p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
As shown previously in Lemma 1, ALGLOW—with instance J as input—achieves a constant-factor
approximation for the p-mean welfare objective. Hence, the lemma established in this section will enable
us to combine the welfare guarantees of the goods assigned in the while-loop of ALG and the allocation
computed by ALGLOW to obtain the desired approximation result for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
Specifically, given a fair-division instance I = 〈[m], [n], v〉 as input, let {g1, . . . , gk} denote the set of
goods that get assigned as singletons in the while-loop of ALG (Algorithm 1). Furthermore, for 1 ≤
t ≤ k, let It denote the instance obtained at the end of the tth iteration of this while-loop. Since in the
first t iterations ALG assigns goods {g1, . . . , gt} to the first t agents as singletons, we have It = 〈[m] \
{g1, . . . , gt}, [n] \ {1, . . . , t}, v〉. In particular, J := Ik is the instance that remains after the termination of
the while-loop in ALG and this instance is passed on to ALGLOW as input.
Instance J consists of n − k agents and, hence, in J , any p-optimal allocation A∗(J , p) contains
(n−k) bundles. For notational convenience, we will index these bundles from k+1 to n, i.e.,A∗(J , p) =(
A∗k+1(J , p), . . . , A∗n(J , p)
)
.
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Lemma 3. Given a fair-division instance I = 〈[m], [n], v〉with an identical subadditive valuation v, let {g1, . . . , gk}
denote the set of goods that get assigned as singletons in the while-loop of ALG and letJ = 〈[m]\{g1, . . . , gk}, [n]\
[k], v〉 be the instance that remains after the termination of this loop. In addition, letA∗(I, p) = (A∗1(I, p), . . . , A∗n(I, p))
and A∗(J , p) = (A∗k+1(J , p), . . . , A∗n(J , p)) denote p-optimal allocations of instances I and J , respectively.
Then, with constant α = 40,
• For p ∈ (−∞, 0), we have αp
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , p))p ≤
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p.
• For p ∈ (0, 0.4), we have αp
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v
(
A∗j (J , p)
)p ≥ n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p.
• For p = 0, we have αk
k∏
i=1
v(gi)
n∏
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , p)) ≥
n∏
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p)).
We will prove Lemma 3 by considering different ranges of the exponent parameter p separately.
However, in all of the ranges, the desired inequality is obtained by inducting on the number of iterations
of the while-loop in ALG.
6.1 Proof of Lemma 3 for p ∈ (−∞, 0)
For 0 ≤ t ≤ k, recall that instance It := 〈[m]\{g1, . . . , gt}, [n]\{1, . . . , t}, v〉 and its corresponding p-mean
optimal, A∗(It, p) = (A∗t+1(It, p), . . . , A∗n(It, p)).
We prove by induction over all 0 ≤ t ≤ k, that
(40)p
t∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p ≤ n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p (6)
Base Case: When t = 0, we have It = I and, hence, both sides of equation (6) are equal to each other.
Therefore, the base case holds.
Induction Step: We establish inequality (6) for t, assuming that it holds for t− 1.
Consider the good gt that was assigned in the tth iteration of the while-loop in ALG. Note that
v(gt) ≥ 13.53F(It−1) (see Step 4). Without loss of generality, we may assume that gt ∈ A∗t (It−1, p).
This assumption is justified since A∗(It−1, p) is a p-optimal allocation of the instance It−1 and, hence,
A∗(It−1, p) is an (n− t+1)-partition of the goods [m]\{g1, g2, . . . , gt−1}, i.e., gt belongs to one of bundles
in A∗(It−1, p) = (A∗t (It−1, p), . . . , A∗n(It−1, p)).
We lower bound the value of gt in terms of the value of the bundle A∗t (It−1, p).
Case I: v(A∗t (It−1, p)) ≤ 11.33 F(It−1). In this case, we have v(gt) ≥ 13.53F(It−1) ≥ 140v(A∗t (It−1, p));
since, 3.53× 11.33 ≤ 40.
Case II: v(A∗t (It−1, p)) > 11.33 F(It−1). Recall that the goods are indexed in non-increasing order of
value (see Step 2 of ALG) and, hence, gt is the highest valued good in the instance It−1. Therefore,
Lemma 2 gives us
v(gt) ≥ 1
40
v(A∗t (It−1, p)) (7)
Note that inequality (7) holds in both Cases I and II mentioned above. Furthermore, since the current
case addresses negative p ∈ (−∞, 0), we have (40)p v(gt)p ≤ v(A∗t (It−1, p))p.
We add (40)p
t−1∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p
to both sides of the previous inequality to obtain
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(40)p
t∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p ≤ (40)p t−1∑
i=1
v (gi)
p + v(A∗t (It−1, p))p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p (8)
Note that the allocation A∗(It−1, p) is defined over the goods [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt−1} and the bundle
A∗t (It−1, p) contains gt. On the other hand, A∗(It, p) is defined over [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt}. Hence, all the
goods in A∗(It−1, p), with the exception of gt, appear in A∗(It, p).
In other words, the last n − t bundles of A∗(It−1, p) and all the n − t bundles of A∗(It, p) satisfy
n⋃
j=t+1
A∗j (It−1, p) ⊆
n⋃
j=t+1
A∗j (It, p). Using this containment and the fact that A∗(It, p) is the p-optimal
allocation for the instance It, we have 1
n− t
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It−1, p)
)p 1p ≤
 1
n− t
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p 1p .
Exponentiating both sides by p (which in the current case is negative) and multiplying by n− t, gives
us
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It−1, p)
)p ≥ n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p
. Therefore, inequality (8) extends to
(40)p
t∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p ≤ 40p t−1∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t
v
(
A∗j (It−1, p)
)p
≤
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
The last inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. Setting t = k gives us the desired inequality
for p ∈ (−∞, 0)
(40)p
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v
(
A∗j (Ik, p)
)p ≤ n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p (9)
Therefore, Lemma 3 holds for p ∈ (−∞, 0).
6.2 Proof of Lemma 3 for p ∈ (0, 0.4)
For 0 ≤ t ≤ k, recall that instance It := 〈[m]\{g1, . . . , gt}, [n]\{1, . . . , t}, v〉 and its corresponding p-mean
optimal, A∗(It, p) = (A∗t+1(It, p), . . . , A∗n(It, p)).
We prove by induction over all 0 ≤ t ≤ k, that
(40)p
t∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p ≥ n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p (10)
Base Case: When t = 0, we have It = I and, hence, both sides of equation (6) are equal to each other.
Therefore, the base case holds.
Induction Step: We establish inequality (10) for t, assuming that it holds for t− 1.
Consider the good gt that was assigned in the tth iteration of the while-loop in ALG. Note that
v(gt) ≥ 13.53F(It−1) (see Step 4). Without loss of generality, we may assume that gt ∈ A∗t (It−1, p).
This assumption is justified since A∗(It−1, p) is a p-optimal allocation of the instance It−1 and, hence,
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A∗(It−1, p) is an (n− t+1)-partition of the goods [m]\{g1, g2, . . . , gt−1}, i.e., gt belongs to one of bundles
in A∗(It−1, p) = (A∗t (It−1, p), . . . , A∗n(It−1, p)).
We lower bound the value of gt in terms of the value of the bundle A∗t (It−1, p).
Case I: v(A∗t (It−1, p)) ≤ 11.33 F(It−1). In this case, we have v(gt) ≥ 13.53F(It−1) ≥ 140v(A∗t (It−1, p));
since, 3.53× 11.33 ≤ 40.
Case II: v(A∗t (It−1, p)) > 11.33 F(It−1). Recall that the goods are indexed in non-increasing order of
value (see Step 2 of ALG) and, hence, gt is the highest valued good in the instance It−1. Therefore,
Lemma 2 gives us
v(gt) ≥ 1
40
v(A∗t (It−1, p)) (11)
Note that inequality (11) holds in both Cases I and II mentioned above. Furthermore, since the
current case addresses positive p ∈ (0, 0.4), we have (40)p v(gt)p ≥ v(A∗t (It−1, p))p.
We add (40)p
t−1∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p
to both sides of the previous inequality to obtain
(40)p
t∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p ≥ (40)p t−1∑
i=1
v (gi)
p + v(A∗t (It−1, p))p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p (12)
Note that the allocation A∗(It−1, p) is defined over the goods [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt−1} and the bundle
A∗t (It−1, p) contains gt. On the other hand, A∗(It, p) is defined over [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt}. Hence, all the
goods in A∗(It−1, p), with the exception of gt, appear in A∗(It, p).
In other words, the last n − t bundles of A∗(It−1, p) and all the n − t bundles of A∗(It, p) satisfy
n⋃
j=t+1
A∗j (It−1, p) ⊆
n⋃
j=t+1
A∗j (It, p). Using this containment and the fact that A∗(It, p) is the p-optimal
allocation for the instance It, we have 1
n− t
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It−1, p)
)p 1p ≤
 1
n− t
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p 1p .
Exponentiating both sides by p (which in the current case is positive) and multiplying by n− t, gives
us
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It−1, p)
)p ≤ n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p
. Therefore, via inequality (12), we obtain
(40)p
t∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, p)
)p ≥ 40p t−1∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=t
v
(
A∗j (It−1, p)
)p
≥
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
The last inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. Setting t = k gives us the desired inequality
for p ∈ (0, 0.4)
(40)p
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v
(
A∗j (Ik, p)
)p ≥ n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p (13)
Therefore, Lemma 3 holds for p ∈ (0, 0.4).
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6.3 Proof of Lemma 3 for Nash Social Welfare (p = 0)
For 0 ≤ t ≤ k, recall that instance It := 〈[m]\{g1, . . . , gt}, [n]\{1, . . . , t}, v〉 and its corresponding 0-mean
optimal (i.e., Nash optimal), A∗(It, 0) = (A∗t+1(It, 0), . . . , A∗n(It, 0)).
We prove by induction over all 0 ≤ t ≤ k, that
t∏
i=1
v(gi)
n∏
j=t+1
v(A∗j (It, 0)) ≥
(
1
40
)t n∏
i=1
v(A∗i (I, 0)). (14)
Base Case: When t = 0, we have It = I and, hence, both sides of equation (14) are equal to each other.
Therefore, the base case holds.
Induction Step: We establish inequality (14) for t, assuming that it holds for t− 1.
Consider the good gt that was assigned in the tth iteration of the while-loop in ALG. Note that
v(gt) ≥ 13.53F(It−1) (see Step 4). Without loss of generality, we may assume that gt ∈ A∗t (It−1, 0). This
assumption is justified since A∗(It−1, 0) is a 0-optimal (Nash optimal) allocation of the instance It−1
and, hence, A∗(It−1, 0) is an (n − t + 1)-partition of the goods [m] \ {g1, g2, . . . , gt−1}, i.e., gt belongs to
one of bundles in A∗(It−1, 0) = (A∗t (It−1, 0), . . . , A∗n(It−1, 0)).
We lower bound the value of gt in terms of the value of the bundle A∗t (It−1, 0).
Case I: v(A∗t (It−1, 0)) ≤ 11.33 F(It−1). In this case, we have v(gt) ≥ 13.53F(It−1) ≥ 140v(A∗t (It−1, 0));
since, 3.53× 11.33 ≤ 40.
Case II: v(A∗t (It−1, 0)) > 11.33 F(It−1). Recall that the goods are indexed in non-increasing order of
value (see Step 2 of ALG) and, hence, gt is the largest valued good in the instance It−1. Therefore,
Lemma 2 gives us
v(gt) ≥ 1
40
v(A∗t (It−1, 0)) (15)
Here, inequality (15) holds in both Cases I and II mentioned above.
Note that the allocation A∗(It−1, 0) is defined over the goods [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt−1} and the bundle
A∗t (It−1, 0) contains gt. On the other hand, A∗(It, 0) is defined over [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt}. Hence, all the
goods in A∗(It−1, 0), with the exception of gt, appear in A∗(It, 0).
In other words, the last n − t bundles of A∗(It−1, 0) and all the n − t bundles of A∗(It, 0) satisfy
n⋃
j=t+1
A∗j (It−1, 0) ⊆
n⋃
j=t+1
A∗j (It, 0). Using this containment and the fact that A∗(It, 0) is the 0-optimal
(Nash optimal) allocation for the instance It, we have
n∏
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, 0)
)
>
n∏
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It−1, 0)
)
(16)
Multiplying by v(g1) v(g2) . . . v(gt−1) v(gt) on both sides of the previous inequality and using equa-
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tion (15), we get
v(g1) v(g2) . . . v(gt−1) v(gt)
n∏
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, 0)
) ≥ 1
40
v (g1) . . . v (gt−1) v
(
A∗t (It−1, 0)
) n∏
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It, 0)
)
≥ 1
40
v (g1) . . . v (gt−1) v
(
A∗t (It−1, 0)
) n∏
j=t+1
v
(
A∗j (It−1, 0)
)
(via inequality (16))
≥
(
1
40
)t n∏
i=1
v(A∗i (I, 0))
(using the induction hypothesis)
Setting t = k gives us the desired inequality for p = 0
(40)k
k∏
i=1
v(gi)
n∏
j=k+1
v(A∗j (Ik, 0)) ≥
n∏
i=1
v(A∗i (I, 0)).
Therefore, Lemma 3 holds for p = 0 as well.
Using the lemmas established in the previous sections, we now prove Theorem 1 for the exponent
parameter p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
7 Proof of Theorem 1 for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4)
As before, we will write I = 〈[m], [n], v〉 to denote the given fair-division instance. Also, write J =
Ik = 〈[m]\{g1, . . . , gk}, [n]\ [k], v〉 to denote the instance obtained at the termination of the while loop in
ALG. That is, instance J is obtained after allocating the k highest-valued goods as singletons to different
agents and J is passed on as an input to ALGLOW.
Also recall that A∗(I, p) = (A∗1(I, p), . . . , A∗n(I, p)) and A∗(J , p) =
(
A∗k+1(J , p), . . . , A∗n(J , p)
)
de-
note the p-mean optimal allocations of instances I and J , respectively.
So far, we have established two results
(i) Lemma 3: The allocation ({g1}, . . . , {gk}, A∗k+1(J , p), . . . , A∗n(J , p)) achieves welfare comparable to
the optimal p-mean welfare (i.e., comparable to Mp (A∗(I, p))), for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
(ii) Lemma 1: For the instanceJ and any p ∈ (−∞, 0.4], ALGLOW computes an allocationB = (Bk+1, . . . , Bn)
such that, for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},8
v(Bj) ≥ 1
40
M1(A∗(J , 1)) ≥ 1
40
Mp(A∗(J , p)) (17)
The allocation returned by ALG for input instance I is A = ({g1}, . . . , {gk}, Bk+1, . . . , Bn). We will
prove Theorem 1, for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4), by showing that Lemma 3 and Lemma 1, in conjunction, imply
that the p-mean welfare of A is a constant times the optimal p-mean optimal; specifically, Mp(A) ≥
1
40Mp(A∗(I, p)), for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
We split the proof of this inequality into three parts, depending on the range of the exponent param-
eter p.
Case 1: p ∈ (−∞, 0). Since in this case p is negative, to obtain the desired inequality, Mp(A) ≥
1
40Mp(A∗(I, p)), it suffices to show that
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v (Bj)
p ≤ 1
(40)p
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
8For notational convenience, we index the bundles in allocation B from k + 1 to n.
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Exponentiating both sides of equation (17) by p < 0 and summing over j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} lead to
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bj)
p ≤ 1
(40)p
n∑
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , p))p (18)
We add
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p to both sides of the previous equation and apply Lemma 3 (with p ∈ (−∞, 0)) to
obtain the desired inequality
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bi)
p ≤ 1
(40)p
(40)p k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , p))p
 ≤ 1
40p
(
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
)
Case 2: p ∈ (0, 0.4). Note that in this case p > 0. Hence, to obtain the desired inequality, Mp(A) ≥
1
40Mp(A∗(I, p)), it suffices to show that
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v (Bj)
p ≥ 1
(40)p
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
Exponentiating both sides of equation (17) by p > 0 and summing over j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} lead to
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bi)
p ≥ 1
(40)p
n∑
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , p))p.
We add
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p to both sides of the previous equation and apply Lemma 3 (with p ∈ (0, 0.4)) to
obtain the desired inequality
k∑
i=1
v (gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bj)
p ≥ 1
(40)p
(40)p k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
n∑
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , p))p
 ≥ 1
(40)p
(
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
)
Case 3: p = 0. In this case, M0(A) =
(
k∏
i=1
v(gi)
n∏
j=k+1
v(Bj)
) 1
n
. Multiplying inequality (17) over all
j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} gives us
n∏
j=k+1
v(Bi) ≥ 1
(40)n−k
(M0 (A∗(J , 0)))n−k = 1
(40)n−k
n∏
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , 0))
Next we multiply both sides of this inequality by
∏k
i=1 v (gi) and obtain
k∏
i=1
v(gi)
n∏
j=k+1
v(Bi) ≥ 1
(40)n−k
k∏
i=1
v(gi)
n∏
j=k+1
v(A∗j (J , 0)) ≥
1
(40)n
(M0(A∗(I, 0)))n
(via Lemma 3 with p = 0)
Taking the nth root on both sides, we obtain the desired result M0(A) ≥ 140M0(A∗(I, 0)).
Theorem 1 now stands proved for p ∈ (−∞, 0.4).
We next complete the main result by addressing the range p ∈ [0.4, 1]. It is relevant to note that the
arguments used to establish the approximation guarantee in this range are different from the techniques
used so far.
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8 Proof of Theorem 1 for p ∈ [0.4, 1]
For instance I, let ALG assign the k highest-valued goods as singletons in its while-loop. Specifically,
write Ĝ = {g1, . . . , gk} to denote the k goods that are assigned in while-loop of ALG. Instance J =
〈[m]\{g1, . . . , gk}, [n]\[k], v〉 is passed as input to ALGLOW, which returns allocation B = (Bk+1, . . . , Bn).
Recall that B satisfies Lemma 1. Finally, let A = ({g1}, . . . , {gk}, Bk+1, . . . , Bn) denote the allocation
returned by ALG. Also, as before, let A∗(I, p) = (A∗1(I, p), . . . , A∗n(I, p)) denote the p-optimal allocation
of I.
We will prove the following bound for p ∈ [0.4, 1] and, hence, establish the stated approximation
guarantee  1
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
1
n
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bj)
p
 1p ≥ 1
40
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
) 1
p
(19)
Write A∗(I, p) \ Ĝ to denote the allocation (specifically, an n-partition) obtained by removing the
goods Ĝ = {g1, . . . , gk} from the bundles inA∗(I, p), i.e.,A∗(I, p)\Ĝ :=
(
A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ
)n
i=1
. Subadditivity
of v ensures that, for all i ∈ [n], the bundle A∗i (I, p) satisfies
v(A∗i (I, p)) ≤ v
(
A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ
)
+
∑
g∈Ĝ∩A∗i (I,p)
v(g).
Since p > 0, exponentiating the previous inequality by p gives us
(v(A∗i (I, p)))p ≤
v (A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)+ ∑
g∈Ĝ∩A∗i (I,p)
v(g)

p
≤
(
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)
)p
+
∑
g∈Ĝ∩A∗i (I,p)
v(g)p (20)
The last inequality follows from the fact that (x+ y)p ≤ xp + yp, for all p ∈ [0.4, 1] and x, y ∈ R+.
Averaging equation (20) over i ∈ [n] leads to
1
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ))p ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p (21)
To show that the k goods in Ĝ (which are allocated as singletons) substantially contribute towards
p-mean welfare of the computed allocation A, we will next establish the following lower bound for all
1 ≤ t ≤ k
v(gt)
p ≥ 1
(7.06)p
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)p

Recall that It denotes the fair-division instance 〈[m] \ {g1, . . . , gt}, [n] \ {1, . . . t}, v〉, for 1 ≤ t ≤ k.
Write A∗(It, p) = (A∗t+1(It, p), . . . , A∗n(It, p)) to denote a p-optimal allocation of instance It.
The selection criterion of the while-loop in ALG and the fact that Feige’s algorithm achieves an ap-
proximation ratio of 2 ensure
v(gt) ≥ 1
3.53
F(It−1) ≥ 1
7.06
 1
n− t+ 1
n∑
j=t
v(A∗j (It−1, 1))
 (22)
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Index the n bundles in allocation A∗(I, p) \ Ĝ in non-increasing order of value v(A∗1(I, p) \ Ĝ) ≥
v(A∗2(I, p) \ Ĝ) ≥ . . . ≥ v(A∗n(I, p) \ Ĝ) and note that the arithmetic mean of the values of the first
n− t+ 1 bundles is at least as large as the overall arithmetic mean
1
n− t+ 1
n−t+1∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ) ≥
1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ) (23)
Given that allocationA∗(I, p) \ Ĝ constitutes an n-partition of the set of goods [m] \ Ĝ and allocation
A∗(It−1, 1) = (A∗t (It−1, 1), . . . , A∗n(It−1, 1)) is an (n − t + 1)-partition of [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt−1} ⊇ [m] \ Ĝ,
we have the following containment
n−t+1⋃
j=1
(
A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ
)
⊆
n⋃
j=t
(
A∗j (It−1, 1)
)
. Furthermore, by defini-
tion, allocation A∗(It−1, 1) achieves the maximum possible average social welfare among all (n− t+ 1)
partitions of [m] \ {g1, . . . , gt}. Therefore, we have
1
n− t+ 1
n∑
j=t
v(A∗j (It−1, 1)) ≥
1
n− t+ 1
n−t+1∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ) (24)
Equations (22) and (24) lead to
v(gt) ≥ 1
7.06
 1
n− t+ 1
n−t+1∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)

≥ 1
7.06
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)
 (using inequality (23))
≥ 1
7.06
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
 1p (via the generalized mean inequality)
Exponentiating both sides of the previous inequality by p gives us the desired lower bound
v(gt)
p ≥ 1
(7.06)p
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
 (25)
Equation (25) enables us to bound the p-welfare contribution of the goods Ĝ = {g1, . . . , gk} assigned
as singletons
2
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p ≥ 1
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
k
n
1
(7.06)p
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
)
(26)
Recall that ALGLOW—with input instance J = Ik—returns allocation B = (Bk+1, . . . Bn). Next we
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lower bound the values of these bundles Bk+1, . . . , Bn.
v(Bj) ≥ 1
40
M1(A∗(J , 1)) (via Lemma 1)
=
1
40
(
1
n− k
n∑
i=k+1
v(A∗i (J , 1))
)
(by defintion, A∗(J , 1) = ( A∗i (J , 1) )ni=k+1)
≥ 1
40
 1
n− k
n−k∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)
 (instantiating inequality (24) for J = Ik)
≥ 1
40
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)
 (using inequality (23))
≥ 1
40
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗j (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
 1p (via the generalized mean inequality)
Exponentiating by p and summing over all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . n}, we have
1
n
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bj)
p ≥ n− k
n
1
(40)p
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
)
(27)
Combining inequalities (26) and (27) gives us
1
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
1
n
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bj)
p ≥ 1
2n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
k
2n
· 1
(7.06)p
 1
n
n∑
j=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)p

+
n− k
n
1
(40)p
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
)
Note that 2× (7.06)p ≤ (40)p for all p ∈ [0.4, 1], hence, the previous inequality simplifies to
1
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
1
n
n∑
j=k+1
v(Bj)
p ≥ 1
2n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
1
(40)p
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
)
≥ 1
(40)p
(
1
n
k∑
i=1
v(gi)
p +
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p) \ Ĝ)p
)
(since (40)p > 2 for p ∈ [0.4, 1])
≥ 1
(40)p
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
v(A∗i (I, p))p
)
(using inequality (21))
Taking the pth root (with p > 0) on both sides of the last inequality gives us the desired result for the
computed allocation A = ({g1}, . . . , {gk}, Bk+1, . . . , Bn)
Mp(A) ≥ 1
40
Mp(A∗(I, p)).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1 for all p ∈ (−∞, 1].
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9 Conclusion and Future Work
This work studies the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that share a common sub-
additive valuation. We show that, for such settings, one can always (and in polynomial-time) find a
single allocation that simultaneously approximates a range of generalized-mean welfares, to within a
constant factor of the optimal.
For ease of presentation, we focussed on the case in which the agents’ valuations are exactly iden-
tical. Nonetheless, it can be shown that the developed results are somewhat robust: if, say, the agents’
valuations are point-wise and multiplicatively close to each other, then again one can obtain meaningful
approximation guarantees. Here, an interesting direction of future work is to address settings in which
we have a fixed number of distinct valuation functions across all the agents. A nontrivial improvement
on the developed approximation guarantee will also be interesting.
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A Proof of Numeric Inequality from Lemma 2
This section establishes the numeric inequalities used in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Specifically, for p ∈ (−∞, 0)(
1
2
− 1
40
)p
+
(
1
2
)p
≤ 1 +
(
2
11.33
)p
(28)
Also, for p ∈ (0, 0.4), we have (
1
2
− 1
40
)p
+
(
1
2
)p
≥ 1 +
(
2
11.33
)p
(29)
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Write a to denote
(
1
2 − 140
)
, b to denote
(
1
2
)
and c to denote
(
2
11.33
)
. Consider the following differ-
entiable function f(p) := ap + bp − 1 − cp. In order to obtain bounds (28) and (29), it suffices to prove
that f(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, 0.4) and f(p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ (−∞, 0). We first show a useful property of the
function f(p) that will help us in deriving these inequalities.
Figure 1: Plot of the function f(p)
Claim 2. Every extreme point of the function f(p) = ap + bp − 1− cp is a local maximum; here, a = (12 − 140),
b =
(
1
2
)
and c =
(
2
11.33
)
.
Proof We consider the first and second derivatives of the smooth function f :
f ′(p) = ap log(a) + bp log(b)− cp log(c) (30)
and f ′′(p) = ap(log(a))2 + bp(log(b))2 − cp(log(c))2 (31)
Let p be any point that satisfies f ′(p) = 0. That is, cp log(c) = ap log(a) + bp log(b). Instantiating equation
(31) with p = p and substituting the previous expression for cp log(c), we get
f ′′(p) = ap log(a)(log(a)− log(c)) + bp log(b)(log(b)− log(c))
In the above equation, note that the terms (log(a)− log(c)) and (log(b)− log(c)) are positive, since ac > 1
and bc > 1, while the terms log(a) and log(b) are negative since a, b < 1. Therefore, f
′′(p) < 0, which
means p is a local maximum. We have now shown that every extreme point of f is a local maximum.
uunionsq
Note that f(0.4) > 0 and f(0.41) < 0, hence, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists
a point r ∈ (0.4, 0.41) such that f(r) = 0. We will show that f is nonnegative over the interval [0, r] and,
hence, f(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ (0, 0.4).
Given that f(0) = 0 and f(r) = 0, we can apply the mean value theorem to f in the range [0, r] to
conclude that there is a point p0 ∈ [0, r] satisfying f ′(p0) = 0. Using Claim 2, we will next show that f(p)
has a unique extreme point, which is a local maximum, in the range [0, r].
Claim 3. Let p∗ ∈ [0, r] be a point that satisfies f ′(p∗) = 0, then it is the unique extreme point of f(·) and is a
local maximum.
Proof Since f ′(p∗) = 0, p∗ is an extreme point. Additionally, from Claim 2, p∗ is a local maximum.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is another local maximum p1 ∈ R and, without loss of
generality, assume that p1 > p∗.We will show that this implies the existence of a local minimum between
p∗ and p1, hence contradicting Claim 2.
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Consider the point pmin defined as pmin = arginf { f(p) | p ∈ [p∗, p1]}. Note that pmin 6= p∗, p1 because
p∗ and p1 are local maxima, which means their function values are greater than those of the points in
an ε-neighborhood around them. Therefore, applying Fermat’s theorem for stationary points, we get
f ′(pmin) = 0. Since pmin is also the infimum of p ∈ [p∗, p1], it is a local minimum between p∗ and p1.
Therefore, by way of contradiction, we obtain the stated claim. uunionsq
Proof of inequality (29): We now prove that f(p) ≥ 0 for p ∈ [0, 0.4]. Assume, for the sake of contradiction,
that there exists is a point q ∈ [0, 0.4] such that f(q) < 0.
The facts that f(0) = 0, f ′(0) > 0 and f(q) < 0, along with the mean value theorem, imply that there
exists a point p̂ ∈ [0, q) such that f ′(p̂) = 0. Additionally, applying mean value theorem with inequalities
f(0.4) > 0, f ′(0.4) < 0, and f(q) < 0, we get a different point p ∈ (q, 0.4] such that f ′(p) = 0. Existence
of two distinct extreme points contradicts Claim 3 and, hence, establishes that f(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0, 0.4].
Proof of inequality (28): We split the proof of this inequality depending on the range of p:
Case 1: p ∈ (−∞,−1]. Note that a > 12.2 , b = 12 , c < 15 , and p is negative. Substituting these bounds
for a, b and c in the expression for f(p), we get f(p) <
(
1
2.2
)p
+
(
1
2
)p − 1 − (15)p . Equivalently, we have
f(p) < (2.2)|p| + 2|p| − 1 − 5|p|. Since 5|p| ≥ (2.2)|p| + 2|p| for p ≤ −1, we conclude that f(p) < 0 for
p ∈ (−∞,−1].
Case 2: p ∈ (−1, 0). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a p˜ ∈ (−1, 0) such that f(p˜) > 0.
Note that f(−1) < 0. Hence, by applying intermediate value theorem to −1 and p˜, we have a point
p̂ ∈ (−1, p˜) such that f(p̂) = 0. Additionally, mean value theorem with 0 and p̂ implies that there exists
a point p ∈ [p̂, 0) such that f ′(p) = 0. Since this contradicts Claim 3, we have f(p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ (−1, 0).
These two cases imply that inequality (28) holds for all p ∈ (−∞, 0).
B APX-Hardness of Maximizing p-Mean Welfare
In this section, we prove that the problem of computing a p-optimal allocation is APX-hard, for all
p ∈ (−∞, 1], in the demand oracle model. That is, we show that there exists a constant c > 1 such that it
is NP-hard to approximate the optimal p-mean welfare within a factor of c, even if we are given access
to demand queries.
Theorem 2. Given a fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], v〉, wherein the agents have identical, subadditive
valuations, the p-mean welfare maximization problem is APX-Hard for all p ∈ (−∞, 1], in the demand oracle
model.
We prove this hardness result by developing a gap-preserving reduction from the Gap-3DM prob-
lem. An instance C of this problem consists of three disjoint setsX , Y , and Z, of cardinality q each, along
with a collection of 3-uniform hyperedges E ⊂ X × Y × Z. The goal is to find a matching (i.e., a subset
of pairwise disjoint hyperedges) M ⊂ E of maximum cardinality.
Formally, Gap-3DM is the gap version of 3-dimensional matching and it entails distinguishing be-
tween the following types of instances:
(i) YES-instance: There is a perfect matching (a matching of size q) in the given instance C.
(ii) NO-instance: All matchings in C are of size at most αq, with α < 1.
The Gap-3DM problem is known to be NP-hard, for an absolute constant α < 1 [OR14].9
Theorem 2 follows from a gap-preserving reduction. In particular, we will prove that in the YES case
(i.e., when the given instance of Gap-3DM has a perfect matching) the reduced instance of the welfare
problem admits an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 3. In the NO case, the optimal p-mean welfare
is less than 3 c(α), where c(α) < 1 is a constant (that depends of α).
9Note that the given instances in this problem are promised to be either YES or NO instances.
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Therefore, given a 1c(α) -approximation algorithm for p-mean welfare maximization, one could distin-
guish between the YES and NO instances of Gap-3DM. Hence, the hardness of Gap-3DM implies that it
is NP-hard to approximate the optimal p-mean welfare with a constant factor of 1/c(α).
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Given an instance C of Gap-3DM with 3-uniform hyperedges E = {E1, . . . , ET } over size-q sets X , Y ,
and Z, we construct an instance I of p-mean welfare maximization with q agents and 3q goods, one
for each vertex X ∪ Y ∪ Z. All the agents share a common XOS valuation function v: define v(S) :=
max
1≤i≤T
{|S ∩ Ei|} for each subset of goods S ⊂ X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
Note that the value of any subset S is upper bounded by 3, since each Ei is a 3-uniform hyperedge.
We now prove that this reduction is gap preserving.
When the input instance C is a YES instance, there is a matching of size q. We assign the three goods
corresponding to each edge in the matching to a distinct agent. In this allocation each agent gets a
bundle of value 3. Therefore, the optimal p-mean welfare in this case is at least 3. Conversely, when C
is a NO instance, every matching is of size at most αq. We claim that in this case, the optimal p-mean
welfare in the reduced instance I is upper bounded by 3 c(α), where c(α) = 2+α3 < 1.
Let A∗(I, p) = (A∗1, . . . , A∗q) denote a p-optimal allocation in instance I. Here, in any allocation, an
agent’s value for her bundle is either 0, 1, 2, or 3. We partition the bundle in the optimal allocation into
two collections H := {A∗i | v(A∗i ) = 3} andH := {A∗i | v(A∗i ) ≤ 2}. Every bundle A∗i in H contains
at least one hyperedge Ej . Since the bundles in H are disjoint, the hyperedges contained in different
bundles are nonintersecting. Hence, such hyperedges form a matching in C of size at least |H|. Recall
that C is a NO instance, i.e., every matching in C of size at most αq. Therefore, there are at most αq
bundles in A∗(I, p) of value 3, |H| ≤ αq. Using this inequality we can upper bound the optimal p-mean
welfare in instance I as follows.
Claim 4. Mp(A∗(I, p)) ≤ 2 + α = 3
(
2+α
3
)
Proof Recall that H and H form a partition of the q bundles in A∗(I, p). Let |H| = αq for some α ≤ α.
Then,
∑
A∗i∈H
v(A∗i ) ≤ 2(1− α)q. Therefore,
Mp(A∗(I, p)) ≤ M1(A∗(I, p)) (via the generalized mean inequality)
≤ 1
q
(3αq + 2(1− α)q) (averaging over the values of bundles inH andH)
≤ 2 + α (since α ≤ α)
uunionsq
Hence, we have a polynomial-time reduction from the Gap-3DM to the p-mean welfare maximiza-
tion problem such that:
(i) When Gap-3DM instance C is a YES instance, the optimal p-mean welfare is at least 3.
(ii) When C is a NO instance, the optimal p-mean welfare is at most 3 c(α), for a constant c(α) < 1.
As mentioned previously, such a gap-preserving reduction establishes the APX-hardness of p-mean
welfare maximization.
Finally, note that we can efficiently simulate the demand oracle for the valuation function v in the
constructed instance I. For any additive function f , the response to a demand query—with prices
pjs associated with the goods—is simply the subset of goods g that satisfy f(g) − pg ≥ 0. The XOS
valuation function v in the reduction is obtained by considering a maximum over T additive functions.
The parameter T is the number of edges in the given Gap-3DM instance and, hence, is polynomially
bounded. Therefore, we can efficiently simulate the demand oracle for v by explicitly optimizing over
all the T additive functions. Overall, we get that the APX-hardness holds in the demand oracle model
and the theorem follows.
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